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Abstract I argue that quantum optical experiments that purport to refute
Bohr’s principle of complementarity (BPC) fail in their aim. Some of these
experiments try to refute complementarity by refuting the so called particle-
wave duality relations, which evolved from the Wootters-Zurek reformulation
of BPC (WZPC). I therefore consider it important for my forgoing arguments
to first recall the essential tenets of BPC, and to clearly separate BPC from
WZPC, which I will argue is a direct contradiction of BPC. This leads to a
need to consider the meaning of particle-wave duality relations and to question
their fundamental status. I further argue (albeit, in opposition to BPC) that
particle and wave complementary concepts are on a different footing than
other pairs of complementary concepts.
Keywords quantum mechanics · Bohr · complementarity · optical tests ·
particle-wave duality
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a proliferation of experimental tests of Bohr’s
principle of complementarity (henceforth BPC) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In reality, such
tests nearly always concern particle and wave complementary concepts. Many
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of the tests are optical tests. Representative and important examples of such
optical tests are in references [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Rauch et al’s use of a single
silicon crystal, suitably cut, as a neutron interferometer [11] allowed many
experimental tests of aspects of particle-wave duality using neutrons (see for
example [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]). More recently, experiments on the particle-
wave aspects of atoms have been made possible with the development of the
atom interferometer [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Further references of tests of
complementarity may be found in Ghose’s book [25].
Many of the tests of complementarity give results which authors claim
confirm complementarity. These include the neutron interferometry tests, the
atom interferometer tests and many of the optical tests. A notable optical
test which claims to confirm complementarity is that of Grangier, Roger and
Aspect (GRA) [10]. The GRA experiment is notable because it was perhaps
the first such experiment to use a gating system to produce genuine single
photon states (Fock states) using photons produced by atomic cascades. How-
ever, GRA fail in their objective to confirm complementarity because, although
their results are consistent with complementarity, their results can just as well
be explained by the Bohm-de Broglie causal interpretation [26, 27], hereafter
referred to simply as the causal interpretation, or its extension to the electro-
magnetic field [28]. All of the experiments which claim to confirm complemen-
tarity can be described in terms of the causal interpretation, or its extension
to boson fields [28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Any experiment consistent with two or
more alternative interpretations or theories cannot be regarded as proof of
one them.
Before proceeding to my main aims, I review other experimental tests of
BPC, and also very interesting related experiments which push the boundaries
of complementarity (and which present challenges to alternative interpreta-
tions of the quantum theory): The Wheeler delayed choice experiment, and
quantum erasure experiments.
A novel test of complementarity uses electrons following two-paths in an
Aharanov-Bohm ring interferometer [33, 34]. After the electrons traverse the
two paths they are recombined to produce interference effects. A quantum
dot embedded in one path and coupled to a quantum-point-contact charge
detector is used for path detection. Their results are consistent with BPC.
The interference of atoms raises the further question of what happens to
their internal structure in an interference experiment. The same question ap-
plies, of course, to fundamental particles with their proposed quark structures,
but the question seems to be particularly poignant with atoms. Further, the
internal structure can be used to mark the path. As expected, when the path
is identified interference is lost in agreement with BPC [18, 19, 20, 22, 23].
Intermediate experiments, where the path is only partially determined result-
ing in reduced visibility interference, have also been performed with results
again consistent with complementarity [21, 24]. A particular question authors
focused on is how complementarity is enforced. In many tests, complementar-
ity is enforced by the position-momentum uncertainty relations. But, in atom
interferometer experiments, authors such as Du¨rr et al [19] and Li [20] have
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demonstrated very clearly that complementarity is enforced by entanglement,
rather than by the uncertainty relations. Specifically, an entangled state be-
tween the internal degrees of freedom and the possible paths is formed such
that interference terms disappear once the path is determined. If we adhere
strictly to BPC, then the question raised above concerning what happens to the
internal structure when atoms interfere cannot be asked. This is so for two rea-
son: First, in BPC, physical reality cannot be attributed to classical concepts.
Secondly, in BPC, an experiment must viewed as an undivided whole, not
further analyzable. However, very few workers, including the present author,
adhere to this strict view and tend to think of an underlying physical reality.
So, although such atom experiments with markers are consistent with BPC,
they surely question the plausibility of BPC. This point is highlighted with
the description of atom interferometry experiments according to the causal
interpretation. Here, when atoms form an interference pattern, the atoms re-
main localized and retain their internal structure throughout, Interference is
produced by the R and S-fields associated with quantum state of the atoms
(The form of the R and S-fields depends on the boundary conditions).
Wheeler added another dimension to the experimental tests with his delayed-
choice experiment. The decision of whether to measure path or interference is
left until the last instant. This leads either to the paradoxical conclusion that
history is changed at the time of measurement, or to Wheeler’s preferred inter-
pretation, that history is created at the instant of measurement. Thus Wheeler
writes,“ No phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon”
[35] pp. 14. He adds that “Registering equipment operating in the here and
now has an undeniable part in bringing about that which appears to have hap-
pened” [36] pp. 194. Wheeler concludes, “There is a strange sense in which this
is a ‘participatory universe’.” [36] pp. 194. That this experiment is consistent
with BPC is guaranteed by a central tenet of BPC, namely, classical concepts
in the quantum theory are abstractions to aid thought and to communicate
the results of experiment, but cannot be attributed physical reality. Wheeler
[35, 36] appears not to adopt the latter tenet, but instead follows Heisenberg
[37], and, in some sense, attributes reality to complementary concepts (and to
the wave function), hence the paradoxical conclusion. We note that Bohr an-
ticipated delayed choice experiments, he writes “. . . it obviously can make no
difference as regards observable effects obtainable by a definite experimental
arrangement, whether our plans of constructing or handling the instruments
are fixed beforehand or whether we prefer to postpone the completion of our
planning until a later moment when the particle is already on its way from one
instrument to another.” [4] pp. 230. Again, both the causal interpretation [38]
and its extension to boson fields [32] can explain the Wheeler delayed-choice
experiment in a causal, non-paradoxical way.
A further push of conceptual boundaries occurred with the introduction
of quantum erasure experiments [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45]. Perhaps the best
example is the quantum eraser experiment of Kim et al [45]. I base my few
comments on this experiment. The two slits of a two-slit experiment are re-
placed by two sources producing entangled photon pairs. One photon of an
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entangled photon pair travels backwards carrying the path information of its
forward moving partner photon, and is directed to one of four detectors by
a system of mirrors and beam splitters. For a photon detected in either of
the two outer detectors, the source from which it was produced is revealed
so the path of its entangled partner is determined with certainty, i.e., pho-
tons detected in either of the two outer detectors retain path information. On
the other hand, a photon detected in either of the two inner detectors passes
through an extra beam splitter, so it may have come from either source, i.e.,
its path information is erased by the mixing of paths at the beam splitter.
Consequently, the path of its entangled photon partner remains completely
undetermined. The other photon of the entangled pair travels forwards to-
ward an interference detector, where interference fringes can be observed. The
detection of the entangled photon pairs is correlated. It was found that for
the backward photons which retain path information, their entangled forward
partners did not form interference fringes, while for those backward photons
for which path information was erased, their entangled forward partners did
form interference fringes (click by click). What makes the experiment so para-
doxical is that the forward photons reach the interference detector long before
their backward entangled partners reach a beam splitter. Therefore, interfer-
ence occurs (or not) long before, the path information is erased (or not). This
implies that a measurement in the present affects a measurement in the past. In
the authors opinion, this is impossible and is not implied by quantum theory.
The reason is that nonlocality is “once-only”, in other words, the entangle-
ment between the two photons is broken upon the first detection, which is
the detection of the forward photon at the interference detector. If nonlocality
was not like this, and persisted after the first detection it would be possible to
set up causal paradoxes and faster than light signaling leading to the possibil-
ity of experimental contradiction with relativity. Thus, once a photon reaches
the interference detector, its entangled connection with its backward travel-
ing partner is broken. Whatever happens to this backward photon, thereafter,
cannot affect the forward detected photon. To justify this view further, the
experimental results have to be calculated based on the quantum feature of
broken entanglement (or once-only-nonlocality).
Many of the experimental tests of complementarity do not deal directly
with BPC, but deal instead with the particle-wave duality relation which has
evolved from the Wootters-Zurek principle of complementarity (WZPC) [46].
In such tests authors equate the duality relation with complementarity, and
claim that complementarity is refuted because the duality relation is refuted.
WZPC has given rise to the so called “intermediate experiments”, in which
the path is only partially determined, resulting in reduced visibility of the in-
terference fringes1. This, in turn, has led to the development of various forms
of the particle-wave duality relation. I will argue in Sect. 5 that WZPC is a
contradiction of BPC, and that WZPC is only meaningfully interpreted with
reference to an ontology, but in this case WZPC loses its fundamental sig-
1 See reference [47] for an early proposal for realisable intermediate experiments.
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nificance. Similarly, care is also needed in interpreting the duality relation if
contradiction is to be avoided. Referred to the same experiment, the duality
relation amounts to a contradiction of definitions of the two mutually exclu-
sive classical concepts of wave and particle. However, the duality relation can
be given a meaning consistent with BPC by interpreting it with respect to
two mutually exclusive experimental arrangements, as suggested by Jaeger,
Shimony and Vaidman (JSV) [48]. Alternatively, as with WZPC, the duality
relation can be given meaning with reference to an ontology. However, with
either of the latter interpretations the duality relation loses its fundamental
conceptual significance. From the mathematical perspective the duality rela-
tion cannot be ignored, and has been derived from quantum theory by JSV
[48], with a particularly rigorous derivation given by Englert [49]. Though the
particle-wave duality relation does not have the conceptual significance nor-
mally attributed to it (at least in the authors opinion), it is clear that it does
have mathematical significance. Therefore, a refutation of the duality rela-
tion would amount also to a refutation of the quantum theory. Even though
a number of experimental tests of BPC are discussed in terms of the duality
relation, all such tests are ultimately direct tests of BPC. In this article, we
will consider all experiments with reference to BPC, but emphasise that the
same reasoning that saves BPC also saves the duality relation.
My main aim, as I have said, is to show that the experiments which purport
to refute complementarity fail, irrespective of whether the results are consid-
ered directly in terms of BPC or indirectly in terms of the particle-wave duality
relations. But from what I have said above, there are crucial preliminaries that
need to be clarified.
First, there is a need to emphasize an aspect of BPC that has been univer-
sally overlooked, and that Bohr would never agree with, namely, that particle
and wave complementary concepts are fundamentally different from other pairs
of complementary concepts
Second, we must clearly separate BPC and WZPC. To do this we first
remind ourselves of the main tenets of BPC, and justify these tenets with
some quotes from the great man himself. Though I am here defending BPC
from experimental refutation, I will make some critical remarks against BPC
on general theoretical grounds. Following this, I consider WZPC and provide
reasons why it must be viewed as a separate principle from BPC, indeed, why it
is a direct contradiction of BPC. Note that the term complementarity has been
extended beyond the classical concepts envisaged by Bohr. An example is the
complementarity between single photon and two-photon interference [50, 48].
Therefore, I will use the abbreviation “BPC” to refer to Bohr’s original strict
version, and use the term “complementarity” in contexts where a more general
usage is appropriate.
Third, I consider the particle-wave duality relations [14, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53,
54].
For my main aim, I select the following experiments for consideration:
The 1991 Ghose, Home and Agarwal experiment (GHA) [6], later performed
by Mizobuchi and Ohtake´ [8]; the Brida, Genovese, Gramegna, and Predazzi
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experiment (BGGP) [7]; and the Afshar experiment [9]. The Afshar experi-
ment, in particular, has received considerable attention, so I will consider this
experiment in greater detail.
In these experimental refutations, one complementary concept is actually
measured (i.e. defined by the experimental arrangement as required by BPC),
while the other complementary property is artificially introduced through an
unjustified assumption or assumptions. In such experiments the experimenters
include an intermediate process, which in classical theory must be described
by the classical concept opposite to the classical concept consistent with the
final actual measurement. But since this concept is not actually measured, it is
never defined in the way demanded by BPC. Thus, BPC (and even the duality
relations) are not even nearly challenged by these experiments. Important to
my defense of BPC is the consideration of what constitutes a measurement and
what constitutes an inference, based on an assumption or assumptions, drawn
from the experimental arrangement. I will address this question in Sect. 7, to-
gether with a moderatley brief overview of quantum mechanical measurement
theory, including a brief outline of my preferred solution of the measurement
problem.
I begin by considering particle and wave complementary concepts followed
by BPC, WZPC, particle-wave duality relations, and then, in separate sections,
the experiments of AHG, BGGP, and Afshar.
2 Particle-Wave Complementary Concepts
Following many authors before me, I begin with Feynman’s famous quote con-
cerning particle-wave duality, [55] vol. III, pp. 1-1, “In reality, it contains the
only mystery”. I have emphasized this quote because it relates to the first
crucial point I wish to emphasize, namely, that particle and wave complemen-
tary concepts are fundamentally different from other complementary concepts,
such as position and momentum, which classically, are canonically conjugate
dynamical variables (CCDV). Complementary concepts which are CCDV are
identified with definite elements of the mathematical formalism of quantum
mechanics, namely, linear hermitian operators, and satisfy uncertainty rela-
tions rigorously derivable from the quantum theory. Crucially, CCDV are
NOT mutually exclusive classical concepts. Classically, such variables have
simultaneously well defined values at all times which precisely define the state
of a classical system. On the other hand, the concepts of wave (field) and
particle are mutually exclusive classical concepts. It is simply a contradiction
of definitions to describe a single object as a wave and a particle. Moreover,
Bohr never identified particle and wave concepts with mathematical elements
of the quantum formalism. Bohr, of course, never accepted such a differenti-
ation of complementary concepts, but instead sought a unified view with all
pairs of complementary concepts on an equal footing. This is very likely, why,
Bohr never viewed complementarity as identical with Heisenberg’s uncertainty
relations. Jammer emphasized this point in his book [5] and writes, “That
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complementarity and Heisenberg-indeterminacy are certainly not synonymous
follows from the simple fact that the latter... is an immediate mathematical
consequence of the formalism of quantum mechanics or, more precisely, of the
Dirac-Jordan transformation theory, whereas complementarity is an extrane-
ous interpretative addition to it” [5] pp. 61. The importance of this separation
is that it clarifies subsequent discussion, and it also removes the perceived
need for a “missing” particle-wave uncertainty relation. It is difficult to see
how a conceptually non-contradictory interpretation of such an uncertainty
relation could be given. Note that the particle-wave duality relation differs
from uncertainty relations, as has been emphasized by Englert [49].
This distinction has important conceptual consequences. CCDV comple-
mentary concepts, which classically are simultaneously measurable and con-
ceivable, are also simultaneously conceivable in the quantum theory. The un-
certainty relations place a limit on their simultaneous measureability, but not
on their simultaneous conceiveability. Thus, it is easy to picture a measure-
ment of, say, position disturbing a previously known value of momentum so
the that the new value of momentum is not known, but this does not prevent
us in the quantum theory from simultaneously picturing a particle with a well
defined position (with a value known by the measurement) and a well defined
momentum (with an unknown value because of the disturbance by the position
measurement). But, with the mutually exclusive concepts of particle and wave,
picturing a single object as a wave and a particle is not possible. This is just
as true in quantum theory as it is in classical theory. A single object is simply
not simultaneously picturable as a wave and a particle. This impossibility is
the root behind the particle-wave duality paradox, and no wonder coined by
Feynman “the only mystery”. In my view, this paradox or “mystery” is only
resolved by an ontological interpretation of the quantum theory, such as the
causal interpretation.
3 Bohr’s Principle of Complementarity
Not withstanding the countless articles relating to complementarity, I believe
that it is still worthwhile to recall the main tenets of Bohr’s (original) principle
of complementarity. As is well known, Bohr’s first presentation of complemen-
tarity in a fairly complete form was in his 1927 Como lecture [1]. Further
presentations of BPC can be found in references [2, 3, 4, 5].
The four core tenets of Bohr’s Principle of Complementarity are as follows:
(T1) The concept of a precisely definable classical state must be given up (be-
cause of the quantum postulate), and a separation of subject (experimen-
tal apparatus) and object (quantum system) is impossible. An experiment
must therefore be viewed as an unanalyzable whole.
(T2) A single picture is not sufficient to exhaust the description of a quantum
system. Rather pairs of complementary concepts are needed. Such com-
plementarity concepts (for example, wave and particle concepts) can only
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be used in mutually exclusive experimental arrangements. Indeed, it is the
experimental arrangement which defines the concept to be used.
(T3) Classical concepts are abstractions to aid thought and to communicate the
results of experiment, but cannot be attributed physical reality.
(T4) A description of physical processes that underlie experiment in terms of
a single well defined model is impossible, i.e., a description of underlying
physical reality in terms of a single-well defined model is impossible.
T1 stems from Bohr’s quantum postulate, which states that a quantum sys-
tem interacts with its environment (e.g. measuring apparatus) through the
exchange of a quantum of action that is indivisible, uncontrollable, and un-
analyzable. As a consequence, the concept of a classical state defined by a
complete set of well defined dynamical variables has to be given up. This leads
to the conclusion that the apparatus and quantum system must be viewed as
an unanalysable whole. Bohr emphasized that it is the experimental arrange-
ment which defines the property being measured. Possibly, T2 was motivated
by the photoelectric and Compton effects, which were interpreted as indicating
a particle behaviour of light, whilst, hitherto, classical experiments revealed a
wave nature of light, and by the Davisson-Germer experiments in which elec-
tron beams produced interference patterns, hence revealing a wave nature of
electrons, whlist earlier experiments indicated electrons had a particle nature.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that T3 was motivated by the mutually
exclusive nature of wave and particle concepts. Perhaps, Bohr felt that the
application of wave and particle concepts to the same physical object is a con-
tradiction of definitions, even if, as he stated, they cannot both be applied in
the same experiment. It appears, especially with regard to particle and wave
complementary concepts, that Bohr’s aim was to provide a framework for the
non-contradictory use of classical language/concepts. The latter point is indi-
cated in the following quotes from Bohr, “...in dealing with the task of bringing
order into an entirely new field of experience, we could hardly trust in any ac-
customed principles, however broad, apart from the demand of avoiding logical
inconsistencies...” [4] pp. 228, and “...we cannot seek a physical explanation
in the customary sense, but all we can demand in a new field of experience is
the removal of any apparent contradiction.” [3] pp. 90.
I finish this brief summary with some more quotes from Bohr’s writings:
(i) In the following quote, relating to T1 and indicating T4, Bohr, referring to
the quantum theory, writes, “its essence may be expressed in the so-called
quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential
discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical
theories and symbolized by Planck’s quantum of action. This postulate
implies a renunciation as regards the causal space-time co-ordination of
atomic processes. Indeed, our usual description of physical phenomena is
based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed
without disturbing them appreciably. . . . Accordingly, an independent real-
ity in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena
nor the agencies of observation.” [1] (b) pp. 580.
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(ii) With regard to T2, we recall the following quote from Bohr: “. . . however
far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation
the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms”. . . “this
crucial point. . . implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between
the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring in-
struments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena
appear. . . . Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental
conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture but must be
regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phe-
nomena exhausts the possible information about the objects. Under these
circumstances an essential element of ambiguity is involved in ascribing
conventional physical attributes to atomic objects, as is at once evident
in the dilemma regarding the corpuscular and wave properties of electrons
and photons, where we have to make do with contrasting pictures, each
referring to an essential aspect of empirical evidence.” [4] pp. 209-210.
Regarding the measurement of complementary concepts Bohr writes, “As
repeatedly stressed, the principal point here is that such measurements de-
mand mutually exclusive experimental arrangements.” [4] pp. 233 and [3]
pp. 60.
(iii) Concerning the reality of particle or wave concepts (referred to in T3) he
writes, “radiation in free space as well as isolated material particles are
abstractions, their properties on the quantum theory being definable and
observable only through their interaction with other systems. Nevertheless,
these abstractions are . . . indispensable for a description of experience in
connexion with our ordinary space-time view.” [2] pp. 57.
Proponents of BPC may well consider my reduction of BPC to four tenets
as anathema. But, I have taken the step to reduce BPC to its essential core
content, as expressed in my for tenets, deliberately for reasons I will try to
explain. I will also try to justify my choice of tenets, since it is unlikely that all
authors would agree with my choice, especially T4. It is well known that there
is no consensus as to the meaning of BPC. It is sometimes stated, perhaps
flippantly, that there are as many interpretations of complementarity as there
are physicists. Though there may be many varied interpretations of BPC, it
does not necessarily mean that all the interpretations, and developments of
BPC (especially more modern versions) are fully consistent with BPC. For ex-
ample, it is not at all clear that even Bohr’s contemporaries (e.g. Heisenberg,
Von Neumann, Wigner) interpreted BPC in a way that was fully consistent
with Bohr’s own expression of his principle. Even Bohr, himself, never reached
a final version of complementarity that he was satisfied with. I have thus come
to the view that attempts to state BPC in an over precise way leads to less
clarity, and perhaps, leads away from Bohr’s original exposition, if not to a
contradiction of Bohr’s view. But BPC does have an essence, a bare-bones
meaning if you like. It is my view that it is in its bare-bones form that BPC
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takes on its most useful form as a guide to working physicists in discussing
experiments. I believe that my four tenets, though intuitively stated and seem-
ingly imprecise, do capture the essence of BPC, and are indeed consistent with
Bohr’s original writings (though not necessarily with other versions of com-
plementarity, especially more modern versions). Though I am not a proponent
of BPC (so it may seem ironic that I am defending BPC in this article, but,
it is just that, I believe that if BPC is to be rejected, it should be rejected
for the right reasons), I think that BPC was an important stepping stone in
the understanding of quantum mechanics for two reasons: (1) In his principle,
Bohr recognised the central new feature of quantum mechanics, namely, the
property of wholeness or interconnectness that is inherent in quantum the-
ory. This recognition, in my view, was an act of genius and a vital element
in understanding quantum theory, and (2) BPC provides a framework for the
non-contradictory use of classical concepts. Here, a clear distinction must be
made between classical concepts and classical theory. Bohr insisted on the use
of classical concepts to describe experiment, not classical theory. The use of
the latter would make no sense, since classical theory failed to describe many
experiments, a failure that inspired the introduction of the quantum theory
(as well as special and general relativity) in the first place.
I suspect that tenet T4 may be subject to the most disagreement. Yet, it
is the inescapable consequence of the other three tenets. If experiments must
be viewed as unanalysable wholes (T1), if pairs of complementary classical
concepts are needed to exhaust the description of nature (T2), and if physical
reality cannot be attached to classical concepts (T3), then it surely follows
that a description of underlying physical reality in terms of a single well de-
fined model is denied (tenet T4). It might be argued that simply attributing
an objective reality to the wave function is an argument against T4 being
regarded as a part of BPC. First, simply attributing reality to the wave func-
tion without further interpretational elements doesn’t constitute a model of
underlying physical reality. For example, interpreting the wave function as an
objectively existing probability wave has no explanatory value. In this view,
what causes the spot on the photographic plate? What is an atom? Probabil-
ity generally refers to an underlying ontology, but does not of itself provide
a model of reality. But second, and more relevant, is that attributing an ob-
jective reality to the wave function as a model of reality directly contradicts
Bohr’s insistence that the world must be described in terms of classical con-
cepts, i.e., the assertion contradicts T2. Further, as an adherent of the causal
interpretation, I certainly attribute reality to the wave function. But reality of
the wave function alone does not lead to the causal interpretation and further
interpretational elements are needed. But, the existence of the causal inter-
pretation doesn’t constitute an argument against T4 being a part of BPC,
but instead, is an argument against BPC in its entirety. Therefore, attributing
reality to the wave function cannot be used as an argument to exclude T4 as
a part of BPC, instead it can be used to argue against BPC in its entirety.
I have not included the so called “classical cut” between the classical and
quantum domains as part of BPC, simply because it never featured in Bohr’s
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writings, i.e., it never formed a part of BPC as presented by Bohr. Rather, the
idea of the cut was introduced and emphasised by Bohr’s followers, especially
Heisenberg [56, 57, 58]. Indeed, the cut was a point of private disagreement
between Bohr and Heisenberg. Though Bohr never publicly rejected the idea
of the cut, neither did he endorse it [58] pp. 6.
The idea of a “cut” seems to be contrary to the BPC assertion (T1) that
an experiment must be viewed as a undivided whole, not further analysable.
This implies that Bohr viewed the classical and quantum worlds as intricately
connected in such a way that they cannot be separated. Whatever processes
occur at the quantum level underlying experiment is completely beyond our
conceptual gaze according to BPC, as is how quantum processes conspire to
form the classical world. That the notion of a cut did not form a part of BPC
is further enforced by the suggestion that Bohr viewed the quantum theory
as no more than a probability calculus, and did not attribute objective reality
to the wave function2. In this case, there is no need to introduce a idea of a
cut, since only the macroscopic phenomena enter in the description of nature,
phenomena which occur with probabilities calculated from the wave function.
As an alternative to my reduction of BPC to four bare bones tenets, I
might point the reader to a recent article by Camilleri and Schlosshauer [58],
in which the authors present a much more detailed exposition of BPC which,
like the present author, is based on Bohr’s original writings. This article also
contains a fairly comprehensive list of references relating to BPC.
Since we are concerned with experimental tests of BPC, we need to con-
sider operational consequences of BPC as expressed in the above four tents.
Tenet T1 has been tested and confirmed a countless number of times by ev-
eryday quantum mechanical experiments. For example, it is straightforward
to construct a Stern-Gerlach experiment to change the spin state of a beam
of electrons, and to subsequently check that the change, except for the special
case of eigenstates, is uncontrollable, unpredictable, and unanalysable in con-
formity with T1. The operational consequence of tenet T2 is the purpose of
this article to discuss. If an experiment can be found in which complementary
concepts are measured in the same experiment, this would contradict tenet T2
and hence BPC. No such experiment has yet been conducted. The particular
experimental tests that we will consider concern attempts to measure (detect)
particle and wave behaviour in the same experiment. If the latter were to be
achieved, this again would contradict tenet T2, and BPC.
Tenet T3 is a prescription for describing experiments in a non-contradictory
way. T3 is thus an interpretational element. A test of T3 is therefore a test
between different interpretations of the quantum theory. However, for interpre-
tations that are consistent with the quantum theory, any experiment whose
2 This view was expressed by Prof. D. Bohm in private discussions during the years 1980
to 1985. Though I have never found a categoric statement in Bohr’s writings to support this
view, there are indications in his writings pointing to this view, for example, Bohr writes,
“...the appropriate physical interpretation of the symbolic quantum-mechanical formalism
amounts only to predictions, of determinate or statistical character, pertaining to individual
phenomena appearing under conditions defined by classical physical concepts.” [4] pp. 238.
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results are consistent with the quantum theory cannot distinguish between
the different interpretations. Different interpretations could, however, suggest
newer experiments. If the results of these newer experiments differed from
the quantum theory, these results may differentiate between the different in-
terpretations. We conclude that an experimental test of T3 amounts to an
experimental test of quantum theory itself.
The correctness of tenet T4 and hence BPC in its entirety, since T4 is an
inescapable consequence of T1, T2 and T3, is directly challenged theoretically
by the existence of the causal interpretation, as we mentioned above. But
again, an experimental test would amount to an experiment to distinguish
between interpretations and similar considerations as in the above paragraph
apply. Therefore, we again conclude that an experimental test of T4 amounts
to an experimental test of quantum theory itself.
4 Critique of Bohr’s Principle of Complementarity
As I have stated, my main aim is to strongly defend BPC against experi-
mental refutation. I do this because I believe that if BPC is to be rejected it
should be rejected for the right reasons. I think that there are strong theoret-
ical and conceptual grounds for rejecting complementarity. An experimental
refutation would require two actual measurements, each consistent with the
opposite complementary concept. I strongly suspect that if such an experiment
is ever achieved, it would also refute the quantum theory. One criticism of BPC
concerns the fact, discussed in some detail in Sect. 2, that particle and wave
complementary concepts are fundamentally different to other complementary
concepts. This renders the unified view sought by Bohr somewhat strained.
Further, describing the same object by two mutually exclusive concepts, al-
beit in mutually exclusive experiments, is of itself inherently contradictory.
No wonder, to achieve consistency, Bohr did not attribute physical reality to
complementary concepts. Such a description hardly constitutes an adequate
description of nature. The causal interpretation also contains both a wave and
particle aspect but in a fundamentally different way: electrons, protons, neu-
trons etc, are particles in every experiment, while the wave-aspect is always
associated with R(x, t) and S(x, t) fields.
A more serious objection concerns my argument, also discussed in Sect.
2, that BPC is not a direct interpretation of the mathematical formalism of
the quantum theory. As I mentioned, though CCDV are identified with linear
hermitian operators, particle and wave concepts in BPC are never identified
with any element of the mathematical formalism. It might be thought that
the recently (relatively) introduced particle-wave duality relation answers the
latter failing, but this view is subject to criticism, as we argue in Sect. 6.
A final serious criticism of BPC is the requirement that a description of un-
derlying physical reality is impossible (tenet T4). This requirement is essential
for the consistency of BPC. This is an extremely high price to pay for consis-
tency. Fortunately, the existence of the causal interpretation based on which
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computer models of underlying physical reality can be produced [59, 60, 61]
not only shows that we are not forced to accept this extreme position, but also
that it is wrong (though I note that recently, the reality of the trajectories in
the causal interpretation has been questioned [62]). As mentioned in Sect. 3,
not all authors would agree with tenet T4. For an alternative discussion of
the reality of trajectories and BPC we refer the reader to an interesting recent
article by Drezet [63] 3.
5 The Wootters-Zurek Principle of Complementarity
In their 1979 article [46] WZ analysed Einstein’s two-slit experiment from the
perspective of partial particle and partial wave information using Shannon’s
measure of information, defined as
H = −
N∑
i=1
pi ln(pi),
where H is a positive number giving the “information we lack”, N is the num-
ber of possible states of the system, and pi is the probability of the system
being in state i. Using this definition, WZ developed a reciprocity measure
of how much wave and particle information can be obtained from the same
experiment. Their analysis led WZ to the following reformulation of com-
plementarity: The sharpness of the interference pattern can be regarded as a
measure of how wave-like the light is, and the amount of information we have
obtained about the photon’s trajectories can be regarded as a measure of how
particle-like it is. I shall call this reformulation WZPC.
Mathematically, the WZ results are very interesting, but as I argued in my
1992 article [64], WZPC embodies everything that Bohr warned against. We
recall the following emphasis from Bohr, “The argument is simply that by the
word “experiment” we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we
have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the
experimental arrangement and of the results of the observations must be ex-
pressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology
of classical physics.”[4] pp. 209. WZPC hardly fulfills this condition.
We expect of a physical concept (together with its mathematical represen-
tation) to have an explanatory (and predictive) function. In classical physics
the concept of wave and its mathematical representation explains interference.
The visibility of the fringes has nothing to do with the degree to which the
wave concept applies, but rather, fringe visibility is a measure of the degree
of coherence of the particular wave profile. Even the tiniest level of visibility
of interference fringes requires a 100% wave model; not 50% or 20%. What
3 In his article Drezet discusses the reality of trajectories and BPC in the context of
arguing that the recently introduced Pusey, Barret and Rudolf (PBR) Theorem, concerned
with ontic and epistemic hidden variable theories, does not preclude the causal interpretation
(sometimes also referred to as Bohmian mechanics).
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possible meaning can be given to the partial application of the wave concept. I
conclude, that so called intermediate experiments in which partial path infor-
mation is obtained at the expense of visibility (which WZ related to the degree
of wave knowledge) are NOT intermediate at all. Even where the tiniest fringe
visibility is observed, BPC clearly demands a 100% wave model. Attributing
a particle concept to such experiments is arbitrary and artificial and certainly
in contradiction with BPC. For example, in a two slit experiment with one slit
half the size of the other, the fringe visibility would certainly be reduced. Clas-
sically, we say that twice as much wave energy passed through the bigger slit.
WZPC would attribute a probability of 0.33 to the path through the smaller
slit and a probability 0.67 to the path through the larger slit, then substitute
these values into their formula to determine the path information. But this al-
location is artificial, since the experiment does not define the particle concept
in the way specified by BPC.
For these reasons I conclude that WZPC is a contradiction of BPC. This
conclusion does not mean that the WZ analysis based on information theory
is not an interesting and valuable analysis; our objection is only in the inter-
pretation of the analysis, and in the claim that it is a reformulation of BPC.
Henceforth, BPC and WZPC will be considered to be two entirely separate
principles.
Perhaps ironically, WZPC can be consistently interpreted using the nonrel-
ativistic causal interpretation [26, 27] (but not its extension to boson fields4).
In other words, WZPC can be given a conceptually consistent interpretation
with reference to an appropriate ontology. This is not a surprise, since classical
probability and classical information theory refer to an underlying ontology.
In the causal interpretation electrons, protons etc (but not photons, for the
reasons given in footnote 4) are particles with associated guiding fields (the R-
and S-fields5). This model contains a 100% particle concept and a 100% wave
concept. In the two-slit experiment, an electron, say, passes through only one
slit, and is then guided by the R- and S-fields to a bright fringe. In interme-
diate experiments it now becomes meaningful (and non-artificial) to attribute
a probability to each possible path. Therefore, a particle is a 100% a particle,
but its path in a particular experiment may not be determined with 100%
certainty6. The visibility, as in classical physics, is defined with respect to a
100% wave concept, and measures the coherence of a particular wave profile,
i.e., a particular profile of the R and S-fields.
4 Photons are bosons and are governed by the second quantized Maxwell equations. In
the causal interpretation of boson fields, fundamental entities are purely fields; there are no
boson particles. In this case WZPC cannot be given meaning based on this ontology.
5 The R and S-fields defined by ψ = R exp(iS/h¯) are not independent of each other.
Both play an equal part in determining a particles motion, the R-field through the quantum
potential Q = −h¯2/(2m)∇2R/R, and the S-field through the guidance formula v = ∇S/m.
6 Actually, in computer models of the two-slit experiment [59, 60, 61] it is seen that trajec-
tories never cross so that a particles path can be theoretically determined with certainty even
when their is interference, and irrespective of whether the experiment is of an intermediate
type or not.
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6 The Particle-Wave Duality Relation
An indication of the importance of the WZ analysis is indicated by the interest
it has attracted from numerous authors, who, based on the WZ analysis devel-
oped a particle-wave duality relation. The first such relation was introduced
by Greenberger and Yasin (GY) [14], with further developments in references
[48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54]. Among the latter are detailed derivations, the most
notable of which are by Jaeger, Shimony and Vaidman (JSV)[48], and then by
Englert [49]. The JSV derivation is notable because of the detailed discussion
on the interpretation given to the duality relations. The Englert derivation is
notable because of its mathematical rigor.
Although the various authors beginning with Greenberger and Yasin arrive
at a similar expression of the particle-wave duality relations,
D2 + V 2 ≤ 1, (1)
and to a similar use of D as a measure of the particle aspect, and of V as a
measure of the wave aspect, the precise interpretation given to D varies con-
siderably. Later authors define D as the distinguishability, while V is always
defined as the visibility. The particle-wave duality relation, given that it origi-
nates from WZPC, suffers from the same criticisms as given above for WZPC.
Like WZPC, the duality relation can be given meaning with reference to an
ontology such as the causal interpretation, but in this case its conceptual sig-
nificance is lost. Since in this interpretation fundamental entities are modeled
as particles guided by fields, it becomes meaningful to ask for the probability
that a particle passes through one slit or the other in a two-slit arrangement.
It also becomes meaningful to ask for the visibility of the interference fringes,
since the profile of the fields (the R and S-fields) guiding the particles de-
termine the visibility. Making one slit half the size of the other will decrease
the visibility while increasing the probability of a particle passing through the
larger slit.
But note, in the causal interpretation, the duality relation is not inter-
preted as “how wave-like” or “how particle-like” a quantum system is. Parti-
cles are 100% particles and fields (waves) are a 100% fields (waves). Instead,
definite probabilities can be attached to each path a particle might take (from
which the path parameter P can be defined). The visibility V is determined
by direct measurement of the maximum and the minima of the interference
pattern, but there is no question of the level of visibility placing a limit on
the wave concept; the full wave concept is needed to explain even the smallest
level of fringe visibility.
But, a more correct model of photons is given by the causal interpretation
of the electromagnetic field (CIEM) [28, 31, 32]. In this interpretation there
are no photon particles; photons are fields (waves). With reference to this
ontology, the duality relations must be interpreted entirely differently, perhaps
as a measure of the coherence of a particular wave profile, without reference
to particles.
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Without reference to an ontology the interpretation of the duality rela-
tions requires care to avoid ambiguity or even contradiction. If the duality
relations are interpreted along the lines of WZPC, i.e., as a measure of partial
wave behaviour or partial particle behaviour, then again we are faced with
a contradiction of definitions. Further, the use of the visibility as a measure
of the wave aspect of a physical system seems questionable, since even the
tiniest level of interference requires a full wave model for its explanation. If
instead, the duality relations are interpreted in terms of particle and wave
information only, contradiction might be avoided, but such an interpretation
leaves the question of what the information is referring to unanswered. This
is hardly satisfactory. We surely expect some kind of explanation of how an
experimental result comes about. Since both of the latter alternative interpre-
tations apply the particle and wave concepts to the same experiment, they
are not consistent with BPC. The best interpretation that does not refer to
an ontology, in my opinion, is due to JSV [48]. They interpreted the duality
relation in terms of predictability with the path parameter and the visibility
parameter referring to two different mutually exclusive experimental arrange-
ments7. Thus, the duality relation predicts that if in a given experimental
arrangement (e.g. the two-slit arrangement) the path is measured with result
P for the path parameter, then a separate mutually exclusive measurement of
visibility V would yield a result consistent with the duality relation (1). Thus,
by interpreting the particle-wave duality relation as referring to two mutually
exclusive experimental arrangements, consistency with BPC is achieved.
We see that the duality relation can be interpreted in different ways de-
pending on the point of view of the interpreter. This fact, especially because
of the existence of ontological interpretations, in my view, diminishes the fun-
damental significance normally attributed to it.
7 What is a measurement?
Although it is not our purpose here to discuss the measurement theory of
quantum mechanics, we will include a brief overview, including a brief outline
of Bohm’s proposed solution of the measurement problem [26] pp. 180 - 193,
which is my preferred solution. The particular questions we want to address,
since their answer is central to our defense of BPC are, “What constitutes a
measurement?”, and “What constitutes an inference, based on an assumption
or assumptions, drawn from the experimental arrangement?”
A detailed mathematical treatment of measurement was given by von Neu-
mann in his book [66]. Von Neumann’s analysis shows that a measurement
results in an entangled state consisting of a sum of terms, with each term
consisting of an apparatus state correlated to an eigenstate of the observ-
able being measured. However, what is observed after the measurement is
7 Drezet also makes this point in his articles given in ref. [65]. In the second of these
articles he discusses the duality relation in some detail in the context of arguing against
Afshar’s claimed experimental refutation of BPC.
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not the entangled state, but the reduction of the entangled state to a single
term representing a single apparatus state (pointer position) and its correlated
eigenstate. This reduction is not described by the Schro¨dinger equation, i.e.,
it is not described by the quantum theory. This is the measurement problem
of the quantum theory. Some authors characterise the problem by considering
that what is observed is not the entangled state resulting from solving the
Schro¨dinger equation, but a mixed state, e.g. [67].
To date, consensus as to the solution of the measurement problem has
still not been reached. A number of solutions have been proposed, and remain
in contention. Bohm, for example, gives a detailed mathematical treatment of
measurement and tries to answer the measurement problem by suggesting that
the apparatus introduces random phase factors which destroy interference be-
tween the different terms of the entangled state. But, this approach does not
explain why a particular term is singled out [68], ch. 22. Later, Bohm, based
on the causal interpretation, gave another solution of the measurement prob-
lem [26] pp. 180-193, which, as mentioned earler, I personally favour and will
outline below. For other approaches to the question of measurement in the
quantum theory we direct the reader to the well known book by Wheeler
and Zureck, [69]. A particularly nice article from this book is by London and
Bauer [67]. Aside from Bohm’s proposed solution, the main other proposals
are: Heisenberg’s [56, 57] and Von Nuemann’s [66] introduction of an arbitrary
classical-cut separating the quantum and classical regimes; that the collapse
of the wave function occurs in the consciousness of the observer has been sug-
gested by a number of authors, e.g. London and Bauer [67], von Nuemann [5]
pp. 474 Sect. 11.2 and notably by Wigner [70]; Everett’s many-worlds (relative-
state) interpretation [71]; and the decoherence approach [72, 73], extensively
developed by Zureck [74, 75]. All of these approaches are thoroughly discussed
in the references given, as well as elsewhere, so we will restrict ourselves to a
few comments.
That each term of the entangled, often infinite, series resulting from a mea-
surement corresponds to a separate universe is fanciful indeed. Many natural
atomic and sub-atomic interactions are essentially measurements, which may
be called natural measurements. So, in Everett’s suggested solution we are
supposed to believe that of the enormous multitude of natural and man-made
measurements on atomic and subatomic systems, each results in the creation
of infinite numbers of new universes, and that in each of these new universes,
the enormous multitude of natural and man-made measurements of atomic
and subatomic systems, themselves each produce further infinite numbers of
universes. This proposed solution certainly lacks conceptual economy, and for
many, like myself, the idea of the continuous creation of infinite multitudes
of universes, especially in the absence of the slightest evidence, is totally un-
acceptable. For example, this proposal begs the mind-boggling question: “In
what kind of super space-time do all these universes exist?”. A more substan-
tial criticism is the fact that the terms of the entangled state resulting from
measurement are not instantaneously orthogonal. During the interaction time
of the system with the apparatus there is a substantial overlap of terms leading
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to a very complicated, and not necessary small, upheaval. Typically, the appa-
ratus in the mathematical treatment of measurement is initially represented
by a wave packet (e.g. a Gaussian). For this initial state of the apparatus the
solution of the Schro¨dinger equation with the appropriate interaction term HI
is a series of apparatus packets, each correlated to an eigenstate of the ob-
servable being measured. It is only when these apparatus packets (correlated
to an eigenstate of the observable being measured) separate, i.e., become ap-
proximately orthogonal, that a measurement can be said to take place. During
the interaction interval, therefore, the wave packets overlap, i.e., interfere with
each other, with effects that may be very large. These effects can be thought
of as ripples in the universe. During the interaction interval and before the
packets separate, these, not necessarily small, ripples should be observable in
the universe an observer happens to be in every time a measurement (natural
or man-made) takes place. No such ripples have ever been observed.
The notion that the collapse of the wave function occurs in the conscious-
ness of an observer is also subject to series objection. The idea arises from von
Neumann’s analysis of measurement, mentioned above, in which the apparatus
is treated quantum mechanically. When does the classical observation of a sin-
gle term of the entangled series come about, i.e., when does the collapse of the
wavefunction occur? One can arrange a second apparatus to measure the state
of the first. But again, what is the state of the second apparatus? One can then
employ a third apparatus to observe the state of the second apparatus and so
on. This leads to von Neumann’s infinite regression. The process must stop
somewhere, and this gives rise to the idea of the classical-cut (which we will
discuss in more detail later) where suddenly quantum laws cease to function
and classical laws take over. The arbitrariness of the position of the cut is a se-
rious objection to the notion of a classical cut. That the collapse occurs in the
consciousness of the observer is a proposed solution to the problem of where
to place the classical cut. The implication of this idea is that a macroscopic
apparatus remains in a superposed state until such time that it is observed
by an observer. Then, what gives the observer the special role of singling out
only one term of the entangled series. If the macroscopic apparatus is gov-
erned by the laws of quantum mechanics, why not the human observer? Why
does the observer not enter into the entangled state, with each state of the
observer correlated via the apparatus to an eigenstate of the operator being
measured? One can argue that the observer knows that he is in a single state.
But, to another observer the entangled state of system+apparatus+observer
exists until such time as he makes his observation. In other words, the issue
is not only the conventional one raised in many texts, namely, how far into
the consciousness should the cut be placed. Rather, it extends outside of the
single observer and becomes an issue of an infinite chain of observers. Clearly,
this solution is untenable.
In the case of Wigner, the idea of collapse occurring in the consciousness
is tied to the notion that the wave function does not have objective reality
but rather represents a probability, i.e., quantum mechanics is a probability
calculus [70] (recall also my earlier suggestion in Sect. 3, footnote 2, that
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Bohr may also have held this view). The notion of collapse occurring in the
consciousness of an observer then becomes an issue of acquisition of more
knowledge by the observer, leading to a representation of the new knowledge
by only a single term of the entangled series. In this form the idea of collapse
produced in the consciousness of the observer becomes more palatable, but if
quantum mechanics is to be viewed as a probability calculus, why introduce
collapse or involve consciousness at all? If the wave function is not attributed
objective physical reality and if it is viewed as only providing probabilities,
then the issue of collapse and therefore a measurement problem does not arise
(it can even be argued that in this view nonlocality doesn’t arise). However,
this view raises the new question, “What brings about the probabilities?”,
i.e., ”What underlies the probabilities?” Classical probability is underpinned
by an ontology governed by causal law. Surely, quantum probabilities do not
come about by magic, but rather there are underlying processes, whether we
understand them or not (at present), that give rise to quantum probabilities. I
would like to pursue the idea of quantum mechanics as a probability calculus
without objective reality a little further as I think it can lead to a world view
that is consistent with BPC that removes the need for the rather undesirable
(in my view physically inconsistent) classical cut.
I present this view because I believe it to be self-consistent even though
it is not my preferred view. As mentioned earlier my preferred view is the
causal Interpretation. My starting point is the following observation. The en-
tire quantum theory, from its very beginnings, is built from results obtained
from macroscopic apparatus. That the results of many experiments were not
consistent with classical theory does not change the fact that all of these re-
sults were obtained from macroscopic apparatuses. From this observation we
can conclude that the relation of the classical and quantum worlds is inbuilt
in the quantum theory. The implication of this is that the transition from
the quantum to the classical world is a smooth transition, whether or not we
understand the mechanism of the transition (Actually, I think that Bohm’s
answer to the measurement problem based on the causal interpretation and
decoherence provides a mechanism for this transition and I will discuss this
later, but this point is not needed for our present argument). With this in mind,
I present the following world view consistent with BPC and which avoids the
measurement problem: Quantum theory is a probability calculus, i.e., the wave
function does not have an objective reality. But, there is an objectively existing
underlying physical reality which gives rise to the quantum probabilities ob-
served by macroscopic apparatus, but which, according to BPC, is completely
and permanently beyond our conceptual gaze. Moreover, the underlying phys-
ical processes work in such a way to produce the classical world. In this view,
there is no measurement problem, no need for a classical cut, and no need to
invoke the consciousness of the observer in the description of measurement.
The first suggestion of decoherence is typically attributed Zeh [72], who ex-
plicitly introduced the role of the environment in the solution of the measure-
ment problem. But, if one reads Bohm’s proposed solution of the measurement
problem based on the causal interpretation, decoherence and the environment
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also play an essential role. In Bohm’s solution, the decoherence arises from the
many thermodynamic degrees of freedom of a macroscopic apparatus, or more
accurately, the inevitable coupling of the apparatus variable/s with the many
thermodynamic degrees of freedom of the environment (because of processes
such as friction, Brownian motion, etc.). I wonder though, why the environ-
ment has to be brought in separately, when the important requirement for de-
coherence is the involvement of many degrees of freedom, and any macroscopic
apparatus at some stage of its operation involves many degrees of freedom.
Let me now proceed to outline Bohm’s solution to the measurement prob-
lem (for details we direct the reader to [26] pp. 180-193), with the aim of
emphasising two important features: First, that decoherence plays an essen-
tial role in the solution of the measurement problem. Second, that the transi-
tion from the quantum to the classical world is gradual. We note that Bohm’s
treatment of the measurement problem can be extended to boson fields by con-
sidering a combined space consisting of ordinary space and the space of normal
mode coordinates. The essential features of the causal interpretation that we
will need are that quantum objects (electrons, protons etc.) are particles guided
by two fields, the R and S-fields defined by ψ(x, t) = R(x, t)e(iS(x,t)/h¯). The R
and S-fields are not independent, but codetermine one another, meaning that
the motion of a particle can be determined from either field. Now, consider a
measurement of an observable Q, with eigenvalue equation Qφq(x) = qφq(x),
of an electron, say, described by the initial wave function ψ(x, t = 0), using
an apparatus described by the initial wave function g(y, t = 0), where y can
represent a single or many variables. Since initially, the apparatus and electron
are independent, the initial combined wavefunction is the product
Φ(x, y, t = 0) = ψ(x, t = 0)g(y, t = 0).
Generally, g(y, t = 0) will have the form of a wave packet (e.g. a Gaussian wave
packet) since the apparatus always has a definite position (at least within some
well defined interval ∆y). For example, g(y, t = 0) may represent the initial
position of an instrument pointer 8.
Bohm considers an impulsive measurement, i.e., a very strong interaction
lasting for a very short time. The action for only a very short time allows
the changes in the apparatus and electron wave functions that would take
place during the interaction time to be ignored. This allows the mathematical
simplification of neglecting the individual Hamiltonians of the electron and
apparatus, leaving only the interaction Hamiltonian HI in the Schro¨dinger
equation, i.e.,
ih¯
∂Φ(x, y, t)
∂t
= HIΦ(x, y, t). (2)
In order for the system and apparatus to be coupled, HI must depend on
operators that commute with Q 9, and on operators that depend on y. A
8 We will not here take up the question of whether or not all measurements can ultimately
be reduced to position measurement, but assume that this is the case.
9 According to Bohm this requirement is needed so that HI does not produce any uncon-
trollable changes in the observable Q, but only in observables that do not commute with
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simple choice of HI , for example, is HI = −aQpy, where a is a constant and
py is the momentum operator conjugate to y.
The solution of eq. (2) has the form
Φ(x, y, t) =
∑
q
φq(x)gq(y, t), (3)
which is an entangled series in which each term represents a correlation be-
tween the apparatus state (pointer position) and an eigenstate of the observ-
able Q. Since initially g(y, t = 0) has the form of a wave packet, so also
will gq(y, t). During interaction the wave packets overlap, so the system and
apparatus undergo very complicated motions. As the packets separate, the
combined system begins to quieten down, until after a sufficiently large sepa-
ration only one wave packet governs the behavior of the apparatus, while the
correlated eigenstate governs the behaviour of the quantum system. The pack-
ets have infinite tales and so never truly separate, but for sufficient separation
affects produced by the overlap of the tails are so negligible that they can be
neglected for all practical purposes. The probability of the packets overlap-
ping again after they have separated when very many degrees of freedom are
involved may be compared to the probability of all the molecules in a room
gathering on one side, leaving a vacuum on the other side. Though possible,
it is so overwhelmingly unlikely, that such an ordering of molecules in a room
has never been observed. Similarly, the reversal of a macroscopic measurement
has never been observed.
Once the packets have separated only the R and S-fields of the wave packet
(and eigenstate) located at the position of the apparatus (and system) influ-
ence the apparatus (and system), i.e., only one term of the series is “active”.
The tails of the other wave packets have a negligible affect at the location of
the active packet. Similarly, since all other eigenstates are orthogonal to the
active eigenstate, they also will not affect the system or the apparatus. Since
the amplitude of the wave packets in the space between their peaks is negligi-
ble, the probability |Φ(x, y, t)|2 between the packets is also negligible, so that
once the apparatus enters a particular wave packet and the system enters the
correlated eigenstate, both remain governed by these thereafter. We see that
it is the ontology of the causal interpretation that resolves the measurement
problem without collapse, since, in addition to the apparatus having a defi-
nite position, quantum objects, being particles, also have a definite position,
Q. However, according to quantum theory, an arbitrary initial wave function cannot have a
well defined eigenvalue of Q prior to measurement, unless it is an eigenstate of the observ-
able being measured. It is the measurement process that changes the wave function into an
eigenfunction of Q, with a corresponding definite eigenvalue q. In general, therefore, both
the wave function and the value of Q is changed by a measurement. If this were not the case
one could equally well envisage a mutually exclusive impulsive measurement that does not
change the value of an observable P that does not commute with Q. This would imply that
both Q and P have well defined values prior to measurement, whereas the wavefunction
does not describe these values. This would constitute a variant of the EPR incompleteness
argument. We conclude that Q and P cannot have definite values prior to measurement,
unless the wave function is an eigenstate of one of them, in which case, only that observable
will have a definite value.
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and it is the position of the apparatus and quantum system that selects the
“active” packet. The active term can be renormalised without affecting any
physical quantity, so that for all practical purposes the state of the apparatus
and system will be given by
Φ(x, y, t) = φq(x)gq(y, t).
This explains why only one term of the entangled series solution of the Schro¨dinger
equation is observed in a measurement without the need to invoke the collapse
mechanism, a mechanism not described by the quantum theory.
The apparatus variable y may represent one thermodynamic degree of
freedom, i.e. a single variable, (as is the case of an atomic coordinate in a
Stern-Gerlach experiment), a few degrees of freedom or a myriad of thermo-
dynamic degrees of freedom. In the first two cases the wave packets can be
made to re-overlap either preventing a definite measurement or reversing the
measurement, i.e., restoring the system to its original state (we will give an
example of the latter below). Where many thermodynamic degrees of free-
dom are involved, the possibility to overlap again once they have separated
becomes overwhelmingly unlikely, since the packets will fail to overlap if they
are widely spaced for even a single coordinate. The possibility for the wave
packets to re-overlap once they have separated can, therefore, be neglected
for all practical purposes. In this case, an irreversible measurement has been
achieved. Ultimately, any measurement, the result of which can be observed
by an experimenter, falls into the latter category since observation requires
amplification to the macroscopic level, which always involves a myriad of ther-
modynamic degrees of freedom. Bohm emphasized this, pointing out that for
any real measurement the apparatus variable eventually must become cou-
pled to many degrees of freedom (e.g. through friction in the pointer pivot
etc.). Thus, Bohm’s proposed solution of the measurement problem involves
the environment and precedes Zeh’s suggestion. We may note that including
the environment separately, i.e., writing the solution of eq. (2) as
Φ(x, y, t) =
∑
q
φq(x)gq(y, t)eq(z, t),
seems to be essentially equivalent to the solution (3) of eq.(2), when the ap-
paratus wave packet is a function of many degrees of freedom.
Finally, we would like to emphasize, as promised earlier, that Bohm’s pro-
posed solution indicates how the transition from the quantum to the classical
world is a gradual one. As long as only a few degrees of freedom are involved
quantum affects are prominent, but as more and more thermodynamic degrees
of freedom come into play quantum affects are increasingly suppressed until at
the macroscopic level quantum affects are negligible and classical laws serve
as extremely good approximations.
In passing, though not relevant to the present discussion, we mention that
Aharanov et al introduced new measurement protocols, namely protected mea-
surements [76, 77], and weak measurements, first introduced in 1988 [78], and
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developed further in 1990 [79]. Interest in weak measurements is gaining mo-
mentum [80], with weak measurement experiments performed in connection
with Hardy’s paradox [81, 82]. The defining property of a protective mea-
surement is that the system returns to its initial state. A weak measurement
is made by pre-selecting a state (i.e. preparing a system in a given initial
state |i〉), applying a weak interaction (e.g. a weak magnetic field), then post-
selecting a state |f〉. Measurements are repeated for a large number of systems
in the same pre and post-selected states. Mathematically a weak measurement
is defined by
〈A〉 = 〈f |A|i〉〈f |i〉 .
Weak measurements allow a “picture” to be painted of quantum systems be-
tween measurements. However, it is clear that the pictures are averages over
a large number of systems in the same pre and post-selected states, so that
it is by no means clear that the pictures so obtained correspond to actual
quantum reality, i.e. the pictures so obtained may be entirely fictitious. Here
it is worthwhile to recall Bohr’s caution, “...the position of an individual at
two given moments can be measured with any desired degree of accuracy; but
if, from such measurements, we would calculate the velocity of the individual
in the ordinary way, it must be clearly realized that we are dealing with an
abstraction, from which no unambiguous information concerning the previous
or future behaviour of the individual can be obtained.” [2] pp. 66 and [1] (b)
pp. 583. Yet, experimentalist suggest that the concept of weak measurement
has tremendous technological promise [74].
We come now to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this sec-
tion, namely, “What constitutes a measurement?”, and “What constitutes an
inference, based on an assumption or assumptions, drawn from a particular
experimental arrangement?” This distinction is important for our defense of
BPC. The answer depends on a particular ontology or a particular epistemol-
ogy. From the perspective of Bohm’s ontology what constitutes a measurement
is answered above, but a little more elaboration and emphasis is needed. In
Bohm’s ontology a system prepared in a particular state may be considered
a measurement even before it interacts with a macroscopic apparatus and
before any observer is involved, since the state of the system is known with
certainty as can be confirmed by a subsequent interaction with a macroscopic
apparatus10.
For Bohr’s epistemology, i.e., BPC, on the other hand, a measurement is
required to be amplified irreversibly and recorded on a macroscopic apparatus.
Wheeler goes further, as expressed in his famous quote, “No phenomenon is a
phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon. ” [35] pp. 14. Two absolutely
essential, though connected, features define a Bohr measurement: (1) Ampli-
fication to the macroscopic level, and (2) Irreversibility. The irreversibility is
10 This differs from the EPR criteria for elements of reality, since in the EPR experiment
the system is not an eigenstate of either of the non-commuting observables whose values are
predicted with certainty.
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invariably a consequence of amplification. It is important to note that a null
result also constitutes a measurement as long as the possibility of making a
macroscopic, amplified, irreversible record is there. This latter type of mea-
surement is what is performed in the Afshar experiment in determining the
existence of an interference pattern as we shall explain in Sect. 12. Such a null
measurement may be considered a type of non-demolition measurement. Bohr
never gave a precise criteria for what constitutes a macroscopic apparatus,
but rather he considered an apparatus to be macroscopic when it is suffi-
ciently heavy. We may take this working definition to be essentially equivalent
to an apparatus being considered macroscopic when it contains a sufficient
number of degrees of freedom.
Since our intention is to defend BPC we will define an “inference” as op-
posed to a measurement in the context of BPC: An inference is a conclusion
drawn from an experimental configuration which neither involves an actual
macroscopic, amplified, irreversible record, nor is there the possibility to make
such a record (to account for null measurements). Thus, an “inference” is nei-
ther a measurement, nor can it be considered a null (nondemolition) measure-
ment. The distinction between a measurement and an inference is therefore
characterised by the absence of either a macroscopic, amplified, irreversible
record, or the possibility to make such a record . Instead, an inference drawn
from an experimental configuration depends on one or more assumptions.
We may illustrate the above with an example of a spin-1 measurement
using the Stern-Gerlach setup described by Feynman [55], vol. III, ch. 5, to
which the reader is referred for details and diagrams.
A beam of atoms of spin l = 1 and arbitrary orientation is passed through
an inhomogeneous magnetic field of width w, and increasing gradient ∇B in
the positive z-direction. For sufficient w and strength, the beam will split into
three beams of spin l = 1 and orientation mz = −1, 0 and 1. In this case the
apparatus variable is the coordinate of the atom. By blocking the 0 and −1
beams, the transmitted beam is known to be in an l = 1, mz = 1 spin state
with certainty, as can be confirmed by recording the positions of the atoms in
the beam on a detecting plate (which conforms to a measurement as defined
above). Before the detecting plate, the spin state of the atoms in the beam is
known with certainty, but no macroscopic, irreversible amplification has taken
place nor is an observer involved. In Bohm’s ontology this constitutes a mea-
surement, but in BPC this is not a measurement until the atoms position is
recorded on a detecting plate. i.e., until a macroscopic, amplified, irreversible
record is made. Since only a single apparatus variable is involved before a de-
tecting plate, the measurement can be reversed, i.e., the atoms can be returned
to their original spin state, by transmitting all three beams through a second
magnetic field of width 2w with opposite orientation to the first, then through
a third magnetic field identical to the first.
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8 Optical Experimental Tests of Complementarity
Having - hopefully - clarified aspects of complementarity, the particle-wave
duality relations and measurement, I come to my main focus which is to argue
that quantum optical experiments which claim to refute complementarity fail
in their aim. As mentioned, I will consider the GHA experiment [6], the BGGP
experiment [7], and especially the Afshar experiment [9], which has received
a great deal of attention. Some of the experiments test the duality relation
and not BPC directly. As I mentioned earlier, despite this, all experiments
ultimately test BPC. Since the same reasoning saves both BPC and the duality
relations, the experiments need not be considered as separately testing BPC
and the duality relation.
A refutation of complementarity requires two actual measurements (as de-
fined in Sect. 7) in the same experiment, with one measurement consistent with
the wave concept, while the other measurement is consistent with the particle
concept. For example, one of the measurements should be an interference pat-
tern recorded indelibly on a detecting plate “click” by “click”, while the other
measurement should be a definite indelible record in a path detector. Yet, to
repeat what I have said in the introduction, in all of these claimed experimental
refutations, one complementary concept is actually measured (i.e. defined by
the experimental arrangement as required by BPC), while the other comple-
mentary concept is artificially introduced through an unjustified assumption
or assumptions. In such experiments, the experimenters include some inter-
mediate process, which in classical theory must be described by the classical
concept opposite to the complementary classical concept consistent with final
actual measurement. But, since this concept is not actually measured, it is not
even defined in the way demanded by BPC. Thus, BPC (and even the duality
relations) are not even nearly challenged by these experiments.
I strongly suspect that an experiment which enables the simultaneous
measurement of complementary concepts (whether particle-wave concepts or
canonically conjugate variables), will also contradict the quantum formalism
itself.
9 The Experiment of Ghose, Home and Agarwal
Here I consider the 1991 experiment proposed by Ghose, Home and Agarwal
[6] and later performed by Mizobuchi and Ohtake´ [8]. It is based on the ex-
periments performed by Bose in 1887 in which Bose observed the tunneling
of microwaves when two asphalt prisms were placed sufficiently close to each
other, [83, 84] and [55] vol. II, pp. 33 -12. The novelty of the GHA proposed
experiment is the use of single photon states.
Genuine single photon states, or one photon Fock or number states, are
not as easy to produce as might be thought. Early experiments used very low
intensity chaotic light where on average only one photon at a time is present in
the apparatus. But, such low intensity light is not a Fock state and possesses
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very different properties. As I mentioned earlier, Grangier, Roger and Aspect
were, perhaps, the first to use genuine single photon states. Pairs of entangled
photons produced either by atomic cascades or by parametric down conversion
are used. One of the pair is used to trigger a gate which remains open for a
time of suitable length to allow its photon partner to pass through a gate with
a very high probability. The photon partner is then in a single photon state
(at least to a good approximation).
Consider the configuration shown in figure 1. The single photon source is
arranged so that only one photon is present in the apparatus at any one time.
Since the 45◦ angle of incidence is greater than the critical angle, total internal
reflection occurs when only one prism is in place. In this case, we expect only
photomultiplier PM1 to register a series of single photon counts. When the
gap between the two prisms is reduced to about a wavelength, tunneling can
occur, so that a photon may be either reflected or transmitted.
This two-prism configuration can obviously be treated mathematically in
the same way as in the case of a single prism beam splitter [85, 86, 87]. Let
R be the reflection coefficient and T the transmission coefficient. There values
will depend on the gap between the two prisms. Phase changes are included
by allowing R and T to be complex numbers. It is assumed that the two prism
configuration corresponds to a lossless symmetrical beam splitter.
Fig. 1 GHA’s beam-splitter configuration using a single photon source. When the gap is
of the order of a wavelength, tunneling can occur.
In figure 1, aˆ1 and aˆ2 are the input annihilation operators, and aˆr and aˆt
are the output annihilation operators. These are related by(
aˆr
aˆt
)
=
(
R T
T R
)(
aˆ1
aˆ2
)
, (4)
or
aˆr = Raˆ1 + T aˆ2, (5)
aˆt = T aˆ1 +Raˆ2. (6)
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The creation and annihilation operators satisfy the usual commutation rela-
tions
[aˆi, aˆ
†
j ] = δij , (7)
where i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. These commutation relations led to the following condi-
tions on R and T
|R|2 + |T |2 = 1, (8)
RT ∗ + TR∗ = 0. (9)
In the experiment, a single photon enters the beam-splitter from input 1, while
input 2 is in the vacuum state. Hence, it is necessary to find aˆ†1, which can be
done using eq.’s (5) to (9):
aˆ1 = R
∗aˆr + T ∗aˆt, (10)
The complex conjugate of eq. (10) gives
aˆ†1 = Raˆ
†
r + T aˆ
†
t . (11)
Let |0〉 = |0〉1|0〉2 = |0〉r|0〉t be the vacuum state for all the beam-splitter
inputs and outputs. The state before and after the beam splitter may now be
written as:
aˆ†1|0〉 = |1〉1|0〉2
= Raˆ†r|0〉r|0〉t + T aˆ†t |0〉r|0〉t (12)
= R|1〉r|0〉t + T |0〉r|1〉t. (13)
The state after the beam-splitter is seen to be an entangled state. The ampli-
tude Ar for reflection is
Ar = r〈1|t〈0|1〉1|0〉2
= Rr〈1|1〉r t〈0|0〉t + Tr〈1|0〉r t〈0|1〉t
= R, (14)
and the amplitude At for transmission is
At = r〈0|t〈1|1〉1|0〉2
= Rr〈0|1〉r t〈1|0〉t + Tr〈0|0〉r t〈1|1〉t
= T. (15)
The corresponding probabilities are |Ar|2 = |R|2 and |At|2 = |T |2. The ampli-
tude Ac for a coincidence count is
Ac = r〈1|t〈1|1〉1|0〉2
= Rr〈1|1〉r t〈1|0〉t + Tr〈1|0〉r t〈1|1〉t
= 0, (16)
so that the probability |Ac|2 for a coincidence count is also zero.
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GHA took perfect anticoincidence to be consistent with particle behaviour.
That is to say, the final experimental results are consistent with particle be-
haviour. For a photon detection in PM1 tunneling must have occurred. Clas-
sically tunneling at the gap can only be explained by wave theory. Therefore,
GHA argued that the classical requirement that tunneling must be explained
by the wave concept amounted to the observation of wave behaviour. GHA
therefore concluded that wave and particle behaviour are observed in the same
experiment in direct contradiction to BPC. In this way, GHA claimed that
their experiment constitutes a refutation of BPC. The theoretically predicted
results were confirmed by the experiment of Mizobuchi and Ohtake´. This was
expected as different results to those predicted would contradict quantum the-
ory.
The refutation however fails. The key point is that the wave behaviour
is never actually measured, but rather, it is only inferred based on the cir-
cumstance that classically tunneling can only be explained in terms of the
wave concept. However, Bohr insisted that a description of mechanisms un-
derlying experiment is impossible and that classical concepts are in any case
abstractions to aid thought that cannot be attributed physical reality. The
only requirement of BPC is that the classical concept be consistent with the
experiment as a whole, i.e., the experimental arrangement and the final exper-
imental result. Indeed, it is the experimental arrangement and measurement
that defines the concept. Since the wave concept is inferred but not measured
it is completely illegitimate under BPC to apply the wave concept to the GRA
experiment. Thus, according to BPC, the GHA experiment is consistent with
(defines) one and only one complementary concept, namely, the particle con-
cept. I conclude that the GHA experiment is perfectly consistent with BPC.
To complete our refutation we need to justify why particle behaviour is
consistent with a measurement, while wave behaviour is not. First, the “clicks”
in the photomultiplier tubes revealing the photon’s path fulfill the definition of
measurement given in Sect. 7, since the photon initiates the release of a cascade
of electrons producing a current which is recorded on a pointer (or digital
readout), a process which constitutes a macroscopic, amplified, irreversible
record. The detections in photomultiplier PM1 certainly confirm transmission,
but do not reveal by what mechanism the photons jumped the gap, whether
they were transmitted as waves or whether they were particles that jumped
the gap. In the process of transmission there is no macroscopic, amplified,
irreversible record of any sort and certainly no such record that is consistent
with either the wave or particle concept, nor is there any possibility for such
a record to be made. We conclude that transmission through the gap niether
fulfils the conditions for a measurement, nor for a null measurement as they
are defined in Sect. 7, and therefore transmission measures neither wave nor
particle behaviour. It follows that the claim by GHA that transmission through
the gap confirms wave behaviour is an inference based on assumption and not
a measurement of wave behaviour.
That BPC is consistent with GHA does not mean that BPC provides a sat-
isfying description of the experiment. Many physicists, including the present
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author, want to picture the physical mechanisms leading to the final exper-
imental result. However, borrowing classical explanations in an ad hoc way
is itself not very satisfactory. It is for these reasons that the present author
favours the causal interpretation and its extension to boson fields, both of
which provide a description of the physical mechanisms leading to the final
experimental result in a way that is fully consistent with the mathematical for-
malism of the quantum theory. It is not our purpose here to discuss the causal
interpretation or its extension in detail, so we will restrict ourselves to some
brief comments. The causal interpretation provides a model for the tunneling
of particles (impossible classically) in terms of the quantum potential 11. The
model is therefore in terms of both wave and particle concepts simultaneously,
so it may be thought that GHA experiment provides evidence for the causal
interpretation. But again, this is not so, since the wave behaviour is never actu-
ally measured by an intermediate measurement. A more accurate model of the
electromagnetic field is provided by the extension of causal interpretation to
the electromagnetic field. In this model photons (indeed, all bosons) are fields,
never particles. In this case, a single photon divides at the first prism face and
tunneling is modeled in much the same way as in classical wave models (though
there are still R and S-fields which guide the behaviour of the electromagnetic
field, but these are now functions of the normal mode coordinates of the field).
The entire GHA experiment is thus described purely in terms of a wave model.
Perfect anticoincidence results, not because a photon followed a single path,
since it split and followed both paths, but because of the nonlocal absorption
of the photon by an atom in one or other photomultiplier [28, 29, 30, 31, 32].
We conclude that in the absence of an intermediate measurement in addition
to the final measured result (anticoincidence), the GRA experiment neither re-
futes BPC, nor confirms one or other of the causal models, i.e., the experiment
cannot differentiate between the different interpretations.
10 The Brida, Genovese, Gramegna, and Predazzi Experiment
Some authors [25, 88] questioned the statistical accuracy of the results of the
Mizobuchi and Ohtake´ experiment. This prompted Brida et al to carry out
an improved experimental test [7] addressing the criticisms of the Mizobuchi
and Ohtake´ experiment. In the BGGP experiment, birefringence replaces tun-
neling through a gap between two prisms as the phenomenon that in classical
theory can only be described by the wave concept. The single photon source
uses type I parametric fluorescent light generated by a UV pump laser which
is then passed through a nonlinear crystal. It is arranged so that only one
photon at a time passes through a birefringent calcite crystal. Through the
crystal the photon path splits along the ordinary or extraordinary directions.
After exiting the crystal the two possible paths are directed to two different
11 Though the R-field gives rise to the quantum potential, the S-field can also explain
tunneling since the R and S-fields codetermine one another. See ref. [59] for a computer
model of quantum tunneling based on the causal interpretation.
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photodetectors. The perfect anticoincidence predicted by quantum mechanics
was again observed. The perfect anticoincidence is consistent with a particle
picture. Brida et al inferred wave behaviour from the fact that the photon
underwent the birefringent phenomenon that classically can only be explained
by wave behaviour. Brida et al, like GHA, claimed that both wave and particle
behaviour is observed in the same experiment thus refuting complementarity.
But, the Brida et al variation of the GHA experiment suffers from the
same criticism as the GHA experiment. The particle behaviour is consistent
with the observed experimental results. The wave behaviour is not measured,
but only inferred from the fact that in classical theory birefringence can only
be explained by a wave theory. But, as for the GHA experiment, the descrip-
tion in terms of BPC is neither constrained by classical theory nor requires
any other mechanism for birefringence, especially since classical concepts are
not attributed physical reality. BPC only requires that the classical concept
be consistent with the experimental arrangement and the final measured ex-
perimental result. There is no conceptual inconsistency in imagining a photon
particle following either the ordinary or extraordinary direction. Again, the de-
tection in the photodetectors, consistent with particle behaviour according to
the Bohr paradigm, fulfills the conditions for a measurement as defined in Sect.
7. On the other hand, the splitting of paths in the calcite crystal is nowhere
amplified irreversibly and recorded on a macroscopic apparatus, nor is there
a possibility of such a recording. Once again, wave behaviour is inferred, not
measured. We see that the BGGP experiment is consistent with (defines) one
and only one complementary concept; the particle concept. I again conclude
that the BGGP experiment is perfectly consistent with BPC.
As for GHA, two alternative descriptions of the BGGP experiment can be
given in terms of the causal interpretation. In the nonrelativistic interpretation
the quantum potential (equivalently the S-field) produces the splitting of paths
along the ordinary or extraordinary directions, with particles following one or
other alternative path depending on their (hidden) initial position. The expla-
nation of anticoincidence follows since the particle registers in one or other of
the photodetectors. A truer model in terms of CIEM explains birefringence,
as in classical physics, by a wave model (but involving the nonclassical R- and
S-fields), and explains perfect anticoincidence by the nonlocal absorption of a
photon.
11 The Afshar Experiment
The aim in the Afshar experiment is to obtain undiminished image quality of
two pinholes of a standard interference experiment when a wire grid is placed
at the previously measured positions of the dark fringes of an interference
pattern. Afshar argued that with the wire grid in place, and if interference
occurs, there should be little or no loss of radiant flux, so that the image quality
should be comparable to the image quality without the wire grid in place. In
this way, Afshar devised a nondemolition measurement of interference fringes.
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The experiment indeed confirmed that there was almost no loss of resolution
or total radiant flux.
If interference did not occur, the wire grid would block some radiant flux
with a corresponding reduction of image quality and resolution. Since there
was almost no loss of resolution or total radiant flux, Afshar concluded that
interference occurred prior to image formation. He attributed the interference
to wave behaviour. Following Wheeler [35], Afshar assumed that the image of a
pinhole must be formed by photons coming from that pinhole, and considered
this to constitute a determination of the photon path. With this he associated
particle behaviour. Afshar concluded that his experiment demonstrates the
measurement of wave and particle behaviour in one and the same experiment
in direct contradiction of BPC (and the duality relation).
Fig. 2 Afshar’s experiment 1: Detection of interference by the photoplate at position σ1
and the accurate measurement of the position of the dark fringes.
Afshar’s experiment is split into three separate experiments. Experiment 1,
shown in figure 2, is a standard two-pinhole interference experiment. Coherent
and highly stable laser light of wavelength λ = 650 nm is directed at a screen
with two pinholes with diameters b = 250 µm, and separated by a distance
a = 2000 µm. The interference pattern is observed at a photoplate placed in
the plane σ1 4 m from the pinholes. The nonstandard feature of this experiment
is the very accurate measurement of the positions of the dark fringes of the
interference pattern.
In experiment 2, shown in figure 3, the photoplate at σ1 is removed and a
lens of diameter 3 cm and focal length f = 100 m is placed 4.2 m from the
pinholes. The lens forms images of the two pinholes in the plane σ2 1.38 m
from the lens. Experiment 2 acts as the control experiment with which the
images formed with the wire grid in place are compared.
In experiment 3, shown in figure 4, a wire grid consisting of six wires is
placed in the plane σ1. The grid is positioned so that the wires of the grid
coincide with the previously measured positions of the dark fringes. Again,
images of the two pinholes are formed at the image plane σ2. As I mentioned
earlier, Afshar observed almost no loss in resolution or of total radiant flux as
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Fig. 3 Afshar’s experiment 2: The photoplate at σ1 is removed and a lens is used to form
images of the two pinholes in the image plane σ2.
compared to the pinhole images obtained in experiment 2. He took this to be a
definite detection of an interference pattern. To further justify his reasoning he
closed pinhole 1, and obtained an image of pinhole 2 but with reduced intensity
(i.e. less radiant flux formed the image compared to the control experiment).
This showed two things. First, the image gives perfect path information so
that D = 1 and supports the interpretation, according to Afshar, that even
with both pinholes open the images give perfect path information. Second, the
reduction in radiant flux shows that there is no interference, so the wire grid
scatters photons significantly. Since image quality (very few photons scattered)
is restored when both pinholes are opened, Afshar considered this as further
evidence that an interference pattern is detected with both pinholes open.
Fig. 4 Afshar’s experiment 3: A grid consisting of six wires is placed in plane σ1 so that
the wires coincide with the six central dark fringes of the interference pattern observed in
experiment 1. Almost no reduction in resolution or total radiant flux of the images of the
two pinholes formed in plane σ2 was observed.
Placing high resolution photodetectors in the positions shown in figure 5
produces more accurate measurements.
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In this way, Afshar concluded that the presence of the wire grid constitutes
a (nondemolition) measurement of interference, and therefore wave behaviour.
On the other hand, by assuming (not measuring) that a photon forming a
pinhole image must have come from that pinhole, Afshar claims to have deter-
mined the photon’s path, and therefore to have observed particle behaviour.
Thus, Afshar claims to have observed wave and particle behaviour in the same
experiment in direct contradiction of BPC.
Afshar equates the particle-wave duality relation to BPC, and measures D
(or his version of the particle parameter) and V . He claims that his experiment
gives values of both D and V nearly equal to 1, so that D2 + V 2 has a value
nearly equal to 2 in direct violation of the duality relation (1), and BPC.
Fig. 5 Afshar’s experiment 3.a: Placing either a photoplate or two photodetectors directly
in the plane σ2 leads to relatively high errors in the total radiant flux. Placing mirrors to
direct the images into high resolution photodetectors produces more accurate results.
Though I will argue below that the Afshar experiment fails to refute ei-
ther BPC or the duality relation (1), it is nevertheless an interesting exper-
iment from a technical perspective. The very interesting feature is the clear
demonstration that interference takes place prior to the formation of the image
without any significant loss of image quality.
The experiment would by even more interesting if it could be repeated
using a genuine single photon source of the type used in the GRA experiment
[10] and in the BGGP experiment [7].
12 Critique of the Afshar Experiment
The Afshar experiment fails to refute either BPC or the duality relation for a
similar reason that the GHA and BGGP experiments fail, namely, because one
complementary concept (the wave concept) is measured while the other (the
particle concept) is inferred from an unjustified assumption. In the case of the
Afshar experiment, the unjustified assumption is that a photon forming a pin-
hole image must have come from that pinhole. Henceforth, I will refer to this
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as the Wheeler-Afshar Pinhole Assumption (WAPA). The WAPA is first of all
not justified by the mathematical formalism of the quantum theory since the
initial wave function is a superposition of wave functions emerging from each
pinhole. We recall Dirac’s famous statement, “The new theory, which connects
the wave function with probabilities for one photon, gets over the difficulty by
making each photon go partly into each of the components. Each photon then
interferes only with itself. Interference between two different photons never
occurs” [89] pp. 9. A further argument against WAPA is the description of the
experiment according to the causal interpretation of boson fields applied to
the electromagnetic field (CIEM) [28, 31, 32]. According to this interpretation,
which is a direct interpretation of the second quantized Maxwell equations, the
photon, as I said earlier, is a field and so passes through both pinholes in a
two pinhole arrangement. Further, the splitting of the photon at two pinholes,
as deduced by Dirac and as required by CIEM, is indicated in the experiment
of Tan, Walls and Collet in which homodyne detectors detect a single photon
in both paths produced by a beam splitter [90]. A photon reaching the pho-
todetector at σ2 is spread over the images of the two pinholes, but registers
as a “spot” in the photodetector. In CIEM, this is explained by the nonlocal
absorption of the photon by atoms/molecules in the detector. The probability
of absorption is highest at positions of highest intensity. When enough photon
“spots” are detected, the images of the two pinholes emerge.
Perhaps WAPA is suggested by the rays of geometric optics. However, the
identification of photon trajectories with rays of geometric optics is arbitrary
and has no theoretical justification. Again, the existence of CIEM emphasizes
that such an association is erroneous, since, in this model, a photon is a field
and passes through both pinholes.
Image formation and interference are perfectly consistent with a pure wave
concept, so that according to BPC the entire Afshar experiment is perfectly
consistent with one and only one complementary concept; the wave concept.
Thus, once we recognize that the claimed detection of path is based entirely
on an arbitrary, unjustified assumption, we see that the Afshar experiment is
perfectly consistent with BPC.
Again, to complete the refutation we need to justify what constitutes a
measurement, as defined in Sect. 7. Image formation at the photoplate clearly
fulfills the conditions of a measurement. Though it is true that the pinhole
images are formed by a large number of individual “spot” detections, image
formation in this way is consistent with wave behaviour according to Bohr’s
paradigm. Even in the ordinary two-slit experiment the interference pattern
is formed by a large number of photon by photon spot detections. The Bohr
paradigm requires that the path of a photon leading to the spot detection be
determined for the detection to be consistent with particle behaviour.
Further, the presence of the grid fulfills the conditions for a measurement,
in this case, a null or nondemolition measurement. Why the presence of the
grid constitutes a measurement of wave behaviour, while transmission through
the gap or splitting of the path by a calcite crystal do not, is because there is
a possibility for an irreversible, amplified detection to be recorded on a macro-
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scopic apparatus (the wire grid). If interference did not take place photons
would be absorbed by the wire grid. Actually, if absorption did take place
in would be revealed by two measurements. First, the absorption would be
measured by a reduction in the intensity of the images. Second, the photon
absorption, if it occurred, could be directly observed (measured) by looking
at the wire grid after the experiment is concluded, since the absorbed pho-
tons would leave an irreversible amplified record on the macroscopic wire grid
(e.g. by coating the grid with a photosensitive material). The absence of ab-
sorbed photons therefore constitutes a null or nondemolition measurement of
interference.
Of course, there have been previous articles criticising Afshar’s refutation.
I mention a few such articles that are particularly notable: Kastner [91, 92],
Steuernagel [93], Qureshi [94] and Drezet [65]. These authors, like Afshar,
equate BPC with the duality relation (1), and defend BPC by defending the
duality relation. Inevitably these articles, including the present article, have
arguments in common, but each includes some original points or arguments
from a different perspective. Taken together, these articles, in my view, con-
stitute a very robust refutation that Afshar’s experiment contravenes either
BPC or the particle-wave duality relation.
Flores and others have agreed with Afshar, and have worked on modified
versions of Afshar’s experiment, either independently [95] or together with
Afshar [96]. The modified experiments suffer from the same serious objections
that Afshar’s experiment suffers from.
Drezet, in his 2011 article [65] presents a detailed argument from the per-
spective of the duality relation to show that Afshar’s experiment does not
refute the duality relation, and therefore also concludes that BPC is not re-
futed by Afshar’s experiment. I note this article in particular because Drezet
discusses the relation of BPC with the duality relation and also the implica-
tions of BPC for the reality of trajectories from a less rigid perspective than
I have done in the present article. Further, Drezet’s arguments against the
Afshar refutation of BPC have some common elements with my own. One ex-
ample, aside from the earlier point in connection with the duality relation (see
footnote 7), is that Drezet also emphasises that a photon forming a pinhole
image need not originate from that pinhole. Also, in common is our conclusion
that Afshar’s experiment does not provide path information.
Kastner agrees with Afshar that a photon detection constitutes a path
measurement, but disagrees with Afshar in that he considers the state before
the photon detection as a superposition state containing no path information.
Kastner considers the photon detection in one image or the other as changing
the photon’s state from the superposition state containing no path information,
to a “path” eigenstate. In this case, unlike Afshar, Kastner concludes that the
“path” eigenstate formed after the photon is detected does not reveal from
which pinhole the photon came. Kastner thus concludes that D in the Afshar
experiment is zero. With D = 0 and accepting Afshar’s measurement of V
close to 1, Kastner concludes that the duality relation is preserved. Kastner’s
conclusion is in line with mine. My only concern is Kastner’s characterisation of
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the final photon state after detection as a“path” eigenstate. Since, as Kastner
himself states, the final photon detection does not reveal from which pinhole
the photon came, in what sense is the detection a path eigenstate? If Kastner
means by a path eigenstate, a position measurement of the photon, then, I
would agree with him. But, since this detection does not reveal the photon
path before detection, this detection cannot be viewed as a path eigenstate.
The latter point is further emphasised, as Kastner himself correctly states, by
the fact that prior to detection the photon is in a superposition state containing
no path information.
Steuernagel criticizes Afshar’s result D2 + V 2 = 2 based on a classical cal-
culation (with results interpreted according to quantum theory). He saves the
duality relation by calculating a value of V to be close to zero and by calcu-
lating a value of D close to one, values that are opposite to those of almost
all other authors, including us. Aside from Steuernagel’s calculation of V close
to zero being a direct contradiction of the actual measured value in Afshar’s
experiment, a measurement considered genuine by almost every other author,
his calculation has been severely criticized by Kastner [92] and Flores [97].
Further, implicit in Steuernagel’s analysis is the identification of photon tra-
jectories with the rays of geometric optics. This is the same identification that
seems to underpin Wheeler’s and Afshar’s WAPA, mentioned and criticized
above. Steuernagel’s (and Afshar’s) value for D close to one based on the
latter arbitrary, unjustified assumption cannot therefore be maintained. We
conclude that Steuernagel reaches the correct conclusion, i.e., that Afshar’s
experiment does not refute the duality relation, but for the wrong reasons.
Qureshi also concludes that Afshar’s analysis is flawed. He saves the duality
relation by arguing that the occurrence of the interference destroys the path
information. This argument can be criticized, both from our arguments above,
but also from the fact that a superposition state is required for interference
to occur. Such a state does not carry path information. In other words, there
was no path information in the first place to destroy.
13 Conclusion
We have tried to make a clear distinction, first, between particle and wave
complementary concepts, which classically are mutually exclusive concepts,
and complementary concepts which classically are simultaneously definable
(and measurable) canonically conjugate variables, and second, between Bohr’s
principle of complementarity and the Wootters and Zurek reformulation of
complementarity. We have argued that the duality relation (with its various
definitions), which evolved from WZPC, does not have the fundamental sig-
nificance that it is normally attributed. But, because of its clear mathematical
significance it is worthwhile to note that the duality relation has been given
a conceptually consistent interpretation by Jaeger, Shimony and Vaidman,
an interpretation also consistent with BPC. I have suggested that a better
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interpretation of the duality relations should be based on an ontological inter-
pretation of the quantum theory, such as the causal interpretation.
Concerning my main task, I have argued that quantum optical experiments
which purport to refute BPC fail. I have tried to show that the reason such
experiments fail is because only one complementary concept is actually con-
sistent (defined) with the experimental arrangement and the measured result,
while the other complementary concept is inferred based on an arbitrary and
unjustified assumption or assumptions..
Although, I have argued against experimental refutations of BPC, I nev-
ertheless feel that such tests are important, because, ultimately, such tests
also test the quantum theory. Moreover, such tests seem to continually push
technological limits. For both of these reasons such experimental tests are to
be encouraged.
Finally, we have suggested that although BPC has not been experimentally
refuted, it can be severely criticized on theoretical and conceptual grounds.
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